accounts-timelinenpm
accounts-timeline is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12137) that executes malicious code on install (malicious versions 9.6.9, 9.6.10, 9.6.11…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in accounts-timeline (npm)
What this malware does
On require of the package's main entry, index.js loads setup.js, which schedules a platform-selection routine via process.nextTick. Depending on OS/arch, setup.js selects one of /pkg/package, /pkg/package.exe, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package-arm64 and invokes lib/telemetry.js runtime.run(), which fetches bytes from hardcoded remote endpoints, base64-decodes them, writes them to /var/tmp (or %TEMP% on Windows), chmods 0755, and executes the resulting binary. The destination hostnames (package-proxy.cf5oob.workers.dev, package-proxy.cf8oob.workers.dev, package-proxy.cf12oob.workers.dev, package-proxy.cf17-ddb.workers.dev, package-proxy.cf25-6eb.workers.dev, and tin/tina/ldr/win subdomains of dl.well1.site) are assembled at runtime from split-string arrays via.join(""), and sensitive API names (child_process, fs.chmodSync, os.hostname, os.platform) are reassembled from property-name concatenation to evade static analysis. setup.js additionally computes an installFingerprint from os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, process.cwd(), process.version, and process.pid, sha256-hashes it, and passes it as installId in the fetch request, causing installer host identifiers to be transmitted to the same attacker-controlled endpoints. The package presents itself as an accounts SDK and has no legitimate need for a platform-branched binary fetch-decode-chmod-exec pipeline pointed at anonymous Cloudflare Workers subdomains.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for accounts-timeline (5 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging accounts-timeline across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove accounts-timeline from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If accounts-timeline was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks accounts-timeline before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks accounts-timeline-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.