accounts-loading-statenpm
accounts-loading-state is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11505) that executes malicious code on install (malicious versions 0.0.1, 8.9.3, 8.9.4…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in accounts-loading-state (npm)
What this malware does
On require() of accounts-loading-state, index.js loads setup.js which schedules bootstrap() via process.nextTick. bootstrap() detects OS and architecture, then invokes lib/telemetry.js run() against a list of string-split-obfuscated mirror hosts (approximately five oob-worker.cfNN-XXX.workers.dev Cloudflare Workers endpoints) with DNS fallbacks under *.dl.well1.site, requesting platform-specific paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package.exe, /pkg/loader_mac, and /pkg/package-arm64. lib/telemetry.js decodes base64 response chunks via Buffer.from(chunks, "base64"), writes the bytes to a staging path under /var/tmp or the Windows TEMP directory, and sets the file executable with fs.chmodSync(..., 0o755) before running it. Host strings and dangerous API names are reconstructed at runtime from split-string arrays (["oob-wor","ker.cf",...].join(""), require("child_"+"process"), fs["chmod"+"Sync"]) to hide indicators from static analysis. Alongside the fetch, setup.js computes an installFingerprint() as sha256 over os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, process.cwd(), process.version, and process.pid, and passes it as installId to the fetching runtime, providing per-victim tracking at the download endpoint. The package presents itself as an analytics/telemetry SDK; the download-and-execute pipeline is the actual behavior.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for accounts-loading-state (7 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging accounts-loading-state across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove accounts-loading-state from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If accounts-loading-state was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks accounts-loading-state before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks accounts-loading-state-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.