ac_calendar_tsnpm
Malicious code in ac_calendar_ts (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, the package's canary.js postinstall script issues an HTTP GET to http://157.230.17.236/dc carrying the installer's os.hostname(), package name, version, a fixed nonce, and a phase identifier. The destination is a hardcoded bare IP over plain HTTP with no opt-in, no documented purpose, and no relationship to any declared package functionality. The package describes itself as a 'dependency-confusion canary,' which matches the pattern used to enumerate internal networks that resolved a public name — the installer's host identifier is exfiltrated to an external operator without consent. The version number (99.99.100) is also consistent with dependency-confusion targeting, in which an attacker publishes an artificially high version under a name expected to exist in a private registry.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ac_calendar_ts (version 99.99.100). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ac_calendar_ts across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ac_calendar_ts is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If ac_calendar_ts was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ac_calendar_ts before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks ac_calendar_ts-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.