Which versions of abuden27 are malicious?

The following npm versions of abuden27 are flagged malicious: 1.1.7, 1.7.7, 2.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate abuden27 if I installed it?

abuden27 establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed abuden27 — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If abuden27 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is abuden27 part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — abuden27 is associated with the GHSA-fw93-gc4v-qw63, IN-MAL-2026-009902, IN-MAL-2026-009904, IN-MAL-2026-009903 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find abuden27 across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for abuden27 (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging abuden27 across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

abuden27npm

Malicious code in abuden27 (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10276

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall abuden27

What this malware does

The tarball ships auto-publish.sh, a script that republishes the same payload under ~100 distinct npm names (ishowfeet1-ishowfeet20, nottuff1-nottuff30, abuden*, imillegal*, ratelimitsucks*, etc/) by rewriting package.json.name and running npm publish --silent in a loop — namespace-spam infrastructure shipped inside the package itself. The package's declared main is sw.js, a browser Service Worker (importScripts('./8cfc2/hgshm.js'), self.addEventListener('install'|'activate'|'fetch'|'message')) that throws immediately if loaded from Node. The shipped assets are a heavily obfuscated Ultraviolet/bare-mux web-proxy frontend with an index.html themed as "Riverbend Tutoring" that hides a popunder redirect to https://abdct.com/ on click/keydown/touchstart. package.json declares no preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare hooks, and require('ishowfeet9') from Node fails before any code runs, so a Node installer experiences no auto-execution. The harm is registry abuse (mass-publication of a misleading name family) and a browser-side proxy/popunder served to whoever later loads these static assets — not installer-side compromise. Routing to human review for namespace-abuse adjudication.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

3 flagged

1.1.71.7.72.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

f38196964dc60a119798b74d6db97940d666c23b18a4a1ed517814d559955cf7

4a0037c8a17a959cd7829f438037488f38087100358afd79b87f485a6777e0d3

7e809ca80fdca78af59f66576c845eaeb709d9ec461bdd4c478a85bae261895b

ed211ac2f97615f796ba55606738acb6f09cad02e79ea1f9820fa51b7dc6c726

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for abuden27 (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging abuden27 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
abuden27 establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If abuden27 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks abuden27 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. abuden27 on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.1.7, 1.7.7, 2.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-fw93-gc4v-qw63IN-MAL-2026-009902IN-MAL-2026-009904IN-MAL-2026-009903

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks abuden27-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring