abuden221npm

The tarball is a static-site / web-proxy build (index.html, /assets/*.js bundles with obfuscated names, a.well-known/discord verification file, branding) rather than a Node.js library. package.json declares main: sw.js, but sw.js is a browser ServiceWorker that calls importScripts('./8cfc2/hgshm.js') — a global that does not exist in Node, so require()-ing this package throws before any code runs. There are no preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare lifecycle hooks, no Node-reachable network I/O, credential reads, or shell execution, so installing the package does not produce installer-side harm. The bundled service worker is an Ultraviolet-style web proxy that, when deployed in a browser, injects a script into proxied HTML responses to redirect window.open / anchor clicks / form submits via postMessage — hostile to users of a deployed proxy site, not to npm installers. The tarball also ships auto-publish.sh, a loop that copies the project to a temp dir, rewrites package.json.name through 10 sequential names (ratelimitsucks, ratelimitsucks1..ratelimitsucks9), and runs npm publish --silent in parallel — registry-namespace-spam tooling. The script is not wired to any lifecycle hook and does not run on install. Obfuscated bundles under assets/ are typical for a deployed proxy frontend and do not execute in Node. Routed to human review because the package is misusing npm as static hosting and documents intent to mass-publish duplicates under sequential names; this is registry abuse worth a maintainer/registry response, but not a supply-chain attack against installers.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.