Which versions of abuden214 are malicious?

The following npm versions of abuden214 are flagged malicious: 1.1.7, 1.7.7, 2.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate abuden214 if I installed it?

abuden214 establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed abuden214 — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If abuden214 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is abuden214 part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — abuden214 is associated with the GHSA-c3vr-r9ph-97h4, IN-MAL-2026-009967, IN-MAL-2026-009969, IN-MAL-2026-009964 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find abuden214 across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for abuden214 (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging abuden214 across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

abuden214npm

Malicious code in abuden214 (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10257

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall abuden214

What this malware does

The tarball ships auto-publish.sh, a script that republishes the same payload under ~100 distinct npm names (ishowfeet1-ishowfeet20, nottuff1-nottuff30, abuden*, imillegal*, ratelimitsucks*, etc/) by rewriting package.json.name and running npm publish --silent in a loop — namespace-spam infrastructure shipped inside the package itself. The package's declared main is sw.js, a browser Service Worker (importScripts('./8cfc2/hgshm.js'), self.addEventListener('install'|'activate'|'fetch'|'message')) that throws immediately if loaded from Node. The shipped assets are a heavily obfuscated Ultraviolet/bare-mux web-proxy frontend with an index.html themed as "Riverbend Tutoring" that hides a popunder redirect to https://abdct.com/ on click/keydown/touchstart. package.json declares no preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare hooks, and require('ishowfeet9') from Node fails before any code runs, so a Node installer experiences no auto-execution. The harm is registry abuse (mass-publication of a misleading name family) and a browser-side proxy/popunder served to whoever later loads these static assets — not installer-side compromise. Routing to human review for namespace-abuse adjudication.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

3 flagged

1.1.71.7.72.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

58c7fcd2e1b973e50e90b997537bd547049593b46c1223e514d37072316d0fe3

4bdbebaa72ae71aae5482f3726a6be11649402b33365104e2fbf39f1db624137

6e579bebdaa0c5ddb71be9720ce8c95d5d6adc71d9fd9b0ea79f48af80c7ea82

7032082b812163ea7552c97f1f1b569ba74ffbe313b2eda9aa399b78d1239d8d

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for abuden214 (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging abuden214 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
abuden214 establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If abuden214 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks abuden214 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. abuden214 on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.1.7, 1.7.7, 2.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-c3vr-r9ph-97h4IN-MAL-2026-009967IN-MAL-2026-009969IN-MAL-2026-009964

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks abuden214-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring