Which versions of abuden1 are malicious?

The following npm versions of abuden1 are flagged malicious: 1.1.7, 1.7.7, 2.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate abuden1 if I installed it?

abuden1 establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed abuden1 — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If abuden1 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is abuden1 part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — abuden1 is associated with the GHSA-9r84-346x-vwj8, IN-MAL-2026-009984, IN-MAL-2026-009986, IN-MAL-2026-009987 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find abuden1 across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for abuden1 (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging abuden1 across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

abuden1npm

Malicious code in abuden1 (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10251

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall abuden1

What this malware does

The tarball ships auto-publish.sh, a script that republishes the same payload under ~100 distinct npm names (ishowfeet1-ishowfeet20, nottuff1-nottuff30, abuden*, imillegal*, ratelimitsucks*, etc/) by rewriting package.json.name and running npm publish --silent in a loop — namespace-spam infrastructure shipped inside the package itself. The package's declared main is sw.js, a browser Service Worker (importScripts('./8cfc2/hgshm.js'), self.addEventListener('install'|'activate'|'fetch'|'message')) that throws immediately if loaded from Node. The shipped assets are a heavily obfuscated Ultraviolet/bare-mux web-proxy frontend with an index.html themed as "Riverbend Tutoring" that hides a popunder redirect to https://abdct.com/ on click/keydown/touchstart. package.json declares no preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare hooks, and require('ishowfeet9') from Node fails before any code runs, so a Node installer experiences no auto-execution. The harm is registry abuse (mass-publication of a misleading name family) and a browser-side proxy/popunder served to whoever later loads these static assets — not installer-side compromise. Routing to human review for namespace-abuse adjudication.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

3 flagged

1.1.71.7.72.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

9a8d449ea7e653b5ec7e32bf327a6c0af7c05c6eea0e21b08da3b56d90e37435

366c27a7f56562405e9af37dcb6a78fa8f535af50e9ecd68ec559fbb1f80f5d7

98dea2d47f05a8e943677d5cc704066de1090483e33180e15063a0d81d62f61d

bba067081816409f0a7e2a20d366d05e78e24f9127c3072a0a22ab1bae89f5f5

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for abuden1 (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging abuden1 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
abuden1 establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If abuden1 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks abuden1 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. abuden1 on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.1.7, 1.7.7, 2.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-9r84-346x-vwj8IN-MAL-2026-009984IN-MAL-2026-009986IN-MAL-2026-009987

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks abuden1-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring