Which versions of @vishadtyagi/full-year-calendar are malicious?

The following npm versions of @vishadtyagi/full-year-calendar are flagged malicious: 0.1.11. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @vishadtyagi/full-year-calendar if I installed it?

@vishadtyagi/full-year-calendar is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @vishadtyagi/full-year-calendar — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @vishadtyagi/full-year-calendar was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @vishadtyagi/full-year-calendar part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @vishadtyagi/full-year-calendar is associated with the GHSA-ppf7-mxm7-7h3h campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @vishadtyagi/full-year-calendar across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @vishadtyagi/full-year-calendar (version 0.1.11). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @vishadtyagi/full-year-calendar across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@vishadtyagi/full-year-calendarnpm

Malicious code in @vishadtyagi/full-year-calendar (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2025-191330

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @vishadtyagi/full-year-calendar

What this malware does

The package @vishadtyagi/full-year-calendar was found to contain malicious code.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

This package was compromised by the Sha1-Hulud: The Second Coming NPM worm. The malicious payload steals tokens and credentials and publishes them to GitHub. The worm will propogate itself to NPM packages the user owns and establish persistence is a GitHub action. The package may also destroy the user's home directory.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.1.11

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

dfc1986873361316d35e34d4981dabc79036cf76099068b3347c5880e0da13e6

4121c4a1002d3934ebf528db305e2187cdc8ad73d4ac8fa8b78aa69a106489a7

e0a98d9edaa6960ab1d23c8814c145f45a3b318e204ab279c76bbe8a47daa044

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @vishadtyagi/full-year-calendar (version 0.1.11). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @vishadtyagi/full-year-calendar across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@vishadtyagi/full-year-calendar is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @vishadtyagi/full-year-calendar was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @vishadtyagi/full-year-calendar before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @vishadtyagi/full-year-calendar on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.1.11 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-ppf7-mxm7-7h3h

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @vishadtyagi/full-year-calendar-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring