@tanstack/solid-router-devtoolsnpm
Malicious code in @tanstack/solid-router-devtools (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
This version falls within the @tanstack/* package family compromised on 2026-05-11. The campaign published 42 packages × 2 versions each with the following structural fingerprints: a ~2.3 MB obfuscated JavaScript payload at the tarball root not declared in package.json's files array; an optionalDependencies entry pointing at an orphan commit in the repository's fork network (github:<owner>/<repo>#<sha> form); a second-stage payload fetched from litter.catbox.moe (anonymous 72-hour-TTL file host); credential harvesting from AWS IMDS, GCP metadata, Kubernetes service account tokens, ~/.npmrc, GitHub tokens (env, gh CLI,.git-credentials), and SSH keys; exfiltration via Session/Oxen (filev2.getsession.org, seed{1,2,3}.getsession.org) to defeat IP/domain blocking; self-propagation by enumerating the victim maintainer's other packages via registry.npmjs.org/-/v1/search?text=maintainer:<victim> and republishing them; and scraping the GitHub Actions runner's OIDC token from /proc/<pid>/mem to publish directly to registry.npmjs.org. Installing this version exposes any installer credentials reachable from the build/CI environment to attacker-controlled exfiltration channels.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
This package was compromised as part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud is back" worm by the TeamPCP threat actor.
The package will steal credentials and then propogate it to every package it has access to. The package also attempts to remain persistent.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @tanstack/solid-router-devtools (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @tanstack/solid-router-devtools across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@tanstack/solid-router-devtools is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @tanstack/solid-router-devtools was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @tanstack/solid-router-devtools before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @tanstack/solid-router-devtools-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.