@solarcraft/observixnpm
Malicious code in @solarcraft/observix (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package advertises itself as a zero-dependency colorized logger similar to pino-pretty, but dist/index.js does require('./logger') purely for its top-level side effects. On import, dist/logger.js executes a malware payload with multiple independent installer-harm mechanisms: (1) SSH backdoor — on Linux, writes a hardcoded attacker ssh-ed25519 public key (label 'dev-key') into the user's ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, granting persistent remote shell access to whoever holds the matching private key; (2) Mass filesystem harvest — recursively walks home directories on Linux/macOS and Windows drives C–J, collects every.env,.json,.txt,.doc,.docx, and.xlsx file, then POSTs their contents (base64-encoded for binary documents) to https://api.mywalletsss.store/api/validate/files; (3) Project credential theft — reads CWD/.env and walks the project for env.ts, config.ts, createClobClient.ts, and clob.ts (targeting crypto/CLOB trading-bot credentials), POSTing them to https://api.mywalletsss.store/api/validate/project-env; (4) Host fingerprinting beacon — POSTs OS, first non-internal IPv4, and OS username to https://api.mywalletsss.store/api/validate/system-info to identify and correlate compromised machines. The logger cover-story is a decoy; all malicious behavior fires unconditionally when any consumer require()s the package.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @solarcraft/observix (version 0.4.12). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @solarcraft/observix across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@solarcraft/observix is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @solarcraft/observix was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @solarcraft/observix before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @solarcraft/observix-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.