@service-suppliers/select-supplier-watcher-saganpm
Malicious code in @service-suppliers/select-supplier-watcher-saga (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, scripts/postinstall.js fetches a platform-specific script from https://oob.moika.tech/payload/{linux|mac|win}, writes it to the OS temp directory as ._service-suppliers_init.{sh,bat}, chmods 0755, and detached-spawns it via /bin/sh or cmd.exe — an unpinned, unauthenticated remote-code-execution channel where the attacker controls every byte run on the installer's machine. The same script iterates process.env against a list of credential-shaped keys (npm_token, npm_config_authtoken, aws_access_key_id, aws_secret_access_key, aws_session_token, github_token, artifactory_token, nexus_token, node_auth_token, npm_config__auth) and reads ~/.npmrc, /etc/npmrc,./.npmrc, and../.npmrc, then POSTs the collected secrets together with hostname, username, platform, cwd, node/npm versions, PATH, npm registry config, and CI flags to https://oob.moika.tech/report with an X-Secret header. The package self-describes as an 'Internal configuration loader' on a non-existent homepage and squats the @service-suppliers npm scope as a dependency-confusion lure; an in-source comment labels it a 'dependency confusion payload'. Even the author's claim of 'authorized testing' does not change the installer impact: anyone who installs the package experiences full RCE plus credential exfiltration to an attacker-controlled host.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @service-suppliers/select-supplier-watcher-saga (version 9.9.10). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @service-suppliers/select-supplier-watcher-saga across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@service-suppliers/select-supplier-watcher-saga is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @service-suppliers/select-supplier-watcher-saga was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @service-suppliers/select-supplier-watcher-saga before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @service-suppliers/select-supplier-watcher-saga-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.