@pulse-web-platform-core/scripts-loadernpm

On npm install, the package's preinstall.js performs an HTTP GET to http://${pkg}.${scope}.oob.moika.tech/poc.js and passes the response body directly to eval() with no integrity verification. The URL embeds the installing package's scope and name as DNS subdomains of oob.moika.tech, causing the installer's resolver and the remote server to receive the target's scope/package context as an out-of-band beacon before any code runs. The fetched payload then executes with the installer's privileges; an in-source comment indicates intent to collect whoami, hostname, ifconfig, and /etc/passwd output. The package metadata (keywords: ["bug bounty"], version 99.99.7, generic description k2 cloud utilities, scope @pulse-web-platform-core) is consistent with a dependency-confusion probe targeting an internal scope, but the install-time behavior is indistinguishable from a malicious supply-chain attack: every installer who pulls this package — whether deliberately or via name-confusion — executes attacker-controlled remote code over unauthenticated HTTP.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.