Which versions of @outmarket/utils are malicious?

The following npm versions of @outmarket/utils are flagged malicious: 9.9.9, 9.9.10, 9.9.11. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @outmarket/utils if I installed it?

@outmarket/utils establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed @outmarket/utils — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @outmarket/utils was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @outmarket/utils part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @outmarket/utils is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-007206, IN-MAL-2026-007208, IN-MAL-2026-007378 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @outmarket/utils across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @outmarket/utils (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @outmarket/utils across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@outmarket/utilsnpm

Malicious code in @outmarket/utils (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-6292

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @outmarket/utils

What this malware does

package.json declares a postinstall lifecycle script that fires automatically on npm install. The inline node -e payload uses hex-encoded property names (\x6f\x73 for os, \x68\x6f\x73\x74\x6e\x61\x6d\x65 for hostname, \x75\x73\x65\x72\x49\x6e\x66\x6f for userInfo) to obscure that it reads os.hostname() and os.userInfo().username, then issues an HTTP GET to http://208.87.128.25:8888/?h=<hostname>&u=<username>. The destination is a bare IPv4 over cleartext HTTP — not a publisher domain or known infrastructure. The package is published under the @outmarket scope with a description identifying it as a dependency-confusion proof-of-concept, but the on-install behavior is indistinguishable from a real dependency-confusion beacon: any installer who resolves this public package in place of an internal @outmarket/utils will leak host identity to the hardcoded endpoint. Hex obfuscation of standard Node API names is evasion, not a legitimate engineering choice.

Malicious versions

3 flagged

9.9.99.9.109.9.11

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

09e0002479ff6c431a5c5bfe6971f2acd915245afac8075caf15023d52428b8f

2cd90f0d706cda01a5740f120f6e8d22ae57d907a5000854439c201b3c53a8c0

528f0f362b90e8b662e0bb0ca5a6620989560b97f74d9dd064a02cb1c7314bf4

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @outmarket/utils (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @outmarket/utils across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@outmarket/utils establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @outmarket/utils was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @outmarket/utils before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @outmarket/utils on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 9.9.9, 9.9.10, 9.9.11 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-007206IN-MAL-2026-007208IN-MAL-2026-007378

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @outmarket/utils-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring