@merceas/anchornpm
Malicious code in @merceas/anchor (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package is published as @merceas/anchor but its README, homepage (https://github.com/coral-xyz/anchor#readme), repository, and source are a verbatim copy of @coral-xyz/anchor — a typosquat/impersonation of the legitimate Solana Anchor SDK. The package.json overrides the standard cross-fetch dependency with an npm alias to a fork under the same scope: "cross-fetch": "npm:@merceas/[email protected]". Installing this package silently pulls @merceas/cross-fetch into the dependency tree, routing every HTTP call made through the SDK (including dist/cjs/utils/registry.js's https://api.apr.dev/api/v0/program/<id>/latest?limit=<n> call, and any fetches consumers make via the SDK's transport) through code controlled by the same actor that published this typosquat. The cross-fetch substitution is the attack mechanism: the malicious payload is in the transitive package the installer is forced to pull, not in this tarball.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @merceas/anchor (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @merceas/anchor across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@merceas/anchor is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @merceas/anchor, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If @merceas/anchor was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @merceas/anchor before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @merceas/anchor-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.