@limebike/supremenpm
Malicious code in @limebike/supreme (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Both preinstall and postinstall lifecycle hooks in package.json execute index.js, which collects the installer's hostname, non-internal network interface IPs, current working directory, package name, and the value of the SECURITY_BUG_BOUNTY_DOCTOLIB_IS_PWN environment variable, and POSTs the JSON payload to http://poc.khz.bar/install over plain HTTP. This fires automatically on npm install without any user action. The package name @limebike/supreme combined with the bug-bounty-themed environment-variable name and exfil host suggests a dependency-confusion proof-of-concept targeting an internal scope, but the structural behavior — unconditional install-time beacon of installer identity to a third-party host over cleartext HTTP — is identical to a supply-chain exfiltration attack and produces a tangible signal for the operator of poc.khz.bar identifying every machine that installed the package.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @limebike/supreme (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @limebike/supreme across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@limebike/supreme is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @limebike/supreme was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @limebike/supreme before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @limebike/supreme-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.