@immobiliarelabs/backstage-plugin-ldap-authnpm
Malicious code in @immobiliarelabs/backstage-plugin-ldap-auth (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package ships a binding.gyp at the tarball root that contains GYP command-expansion syntax (<!(...) / <!@(...)) in its sources/targets configuration (binding.gyp line 6). npm implicitly invokes node-gyp rebuild whenever a binding.gyp is present — even with no declared install/postinstall script — and node-gyp evaluates <!(...) as a shell command during the configure step. This causes attacker-controlled shell to execute on the installer's machine on a default npm install, equivalent to a postinstall lifecycle hook. The package presents itself as an LDAP auth plugin for Backstage, a pure-JavaScript role for which a native addon (and thus a binding.gyp performing shell expansion) is not warranted. The traced content additionally tripped the model safety filter on output, corroborating the malicious shape of the embedded command. Installer impact: arbitrary code execution under the user running npm install, before any application code is invoked.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @immobiliarelabs/backstage-plugin-ldap-auth (5 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @immobiliarelabs/backstage-plugin-ldap-auth across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @immobiliarelabs/backstage-plugin-ldap-auth from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @immobiliarelabs/backstage-plugin-ldap-auth was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @immobiliarelabs/backstage-plugin-ldap-auth before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @immobiliarelabs/backstage-plugin-ldap-auth-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.