@immobiliarelabs/backstage-plugin-gitlabnpm
Malicious code in @immobiliarelabs/backstage-plugin-gitlab (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package ships a binding.gyp at the package root whose targets/sources fields contain GYP command-expansion syntax (<!(...)) at line 6. npm implicitly invokes node-gyp rebuild whenever a binding.gyp is present, even without any declared install/postinstall script, and node-gyp/GYP evaluates <!(...) as a shell command during the configure step. This causes the embedded command to execute on every npm install of this package as a transitive or direct dependency. The package presents itself as a Backstage GitLab plugin (a pure TypeScript/React frontend plugin), a category that has no legitimate need to build a native addon — and consistent with that, no C/C++ source files are shipped alongside binding.gyp, so the file's only effect is to run the embedded shell command at install time. The traced content of this install-time code path was withheld by the upstream model's malware-output safety filter, which is itself a corroborating signal that the executed content reads as operational malware rather than benign build logic.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @immobiliarelabs/backstage-plugin-gitlab (7 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @immobiliarelabs/backstage-plugin-gitlab across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @immobiliarelabs/backstage-plugin-gitlab from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @immobiliarelabs/backstage-plugin-gitlab was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @immobiliarelabs/backstage-plugin-gitlab before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @immobiliarelabs/backstage-plugin-gitlab-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.