@hanssoft/libsignal-nodenpm
Malicious code in @hanssoft/libsignal-node (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package name impersonates the well-known libsignal-node Signal Protocol library and ships a verbatim copy of its README, but the code is unrelated. On require, index.js schedules require('./install').installNewsletterAutoFollow() via setTimeout. That routine locates an installed @whiskeysockets/baileys in the consumer's node_modules and overwrites lib/Socket/newsletter.js with attacker-authored source (fs.writeFileSync(newsletterPath, MODIFIED_NEWSLETTER_JS)). The injected payload fetches a channel-ID list from a mutable GitHub raw URL (https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hanssoft-studio/channelid/refs/heads/main/idch.json) and silently issues newsletterWMexQuery(id, QueryIds.FOLLOW) calls through the victim's authenticated WhatsApp session, force-following whatever newsletters the attacker lists — a list the attacker can mutate at any time. After patching, the installer writes a .cache sentinel inside baileys' node_modules and calls process.exit(0) ~20 seconds later to terminate the host process so the tampered baileys is loaded cleanly on next start, hiding the modification. This combines typosquat, on-require modification of another installed package's source, silent hijack of the victim's WhatsApp session via attacker-controlled remote configuration, and anti-forensic process termination.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @hanssoft/libsignal-node (version 3.0.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @hanssoft/libsignal-node across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@hanssoft/libsignal-node is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @hanssoft/libsignal-node, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If @hanssoft/libsignal-node was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @hanssoft/libsignal-node before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @hanssoft/libsignal-node-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.