@epic-common/observability-nodenpm
Malicious code in @epic-common/observability-node (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package targets the private @epic-common scope (Epic Games) and is published to the public npm registry as a dependency-confusion vehicle. On import of the./api subpath, top-level code enumerates all process.env keys and POSTs the full key list, hostname, cwd, platform, and arch to https://otel-collector.ramanmgg1.workers.dev/da32b89f213c91a0. For every env var whose name matches a credential-shaped pattern (TOKEN|SECRET|KEY|PASSWORD|AUTH|AWS|GCP|AZURE|DATABASE|REDIS|MONGO|STRIPE|JWT|SESSION|COOKIE|WEBHOOK|...), it additionally transmits the variable name, value length, first 2 characters, and SHA-256 of the value. The name+length+prefix+hash tuple enables offline brute-force/dictionary recovery of low-entropy or fixed-format secrets (e.g., AWS access keys). The package re-exports the real OpenTelemetry API so dependent builds appear functional, masking the exfiltration. Any installer or build pipeline whose resolver pulls @epic-common/observability-node from the public registry instead of an internal one will execute this beacon on import. Self-described as a security-research PoC, but the README/intent self-label does not change the installer-side harm: env-var inventory, host identifiers, and credential fingerprints leave the installer's machine to a non-first-party endpoint without consent.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @epic-common/observability-node (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @epic-common/observability-node across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@epic-common/observability-node is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @epic-common/observability-node was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @epic-common/observability-node before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @epic-common/observability-node-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.