Which versions of @convera/ui-shared are malicious?

The following npm versions of @convera/ui-shared are flagged malicious: 0.0.2, 0.0.3. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @convera/ui-shared if I installed it?

Remove @convera/ui-shared from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.

I already installed @convera/ui-shared — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @convera/ui-shared was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @convera/ui-shared part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @convera/ui-shared is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-002775, IN-MAL-2026-002776, IN-MAL-2026-002725 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @convera/ui-shared across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @convera/ui-shared (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @convera/ui-shared across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@convera/ui-sharednpm

Malicious code in @convera/ui-shared (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-3724

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @convera/ui-shared

What this malware does

On npm install, the package's preinstall.js collects os.hostname() and os.userInfo().username and sends them as query parameters (/?hn=<hostname>&un=<username>) via https.request to am0f14nl6o1nqwrngbrq33amfdl496xv.oastify.com, a Burp Collaborator subdomain. The package ships an empty index.js (module.exports = {}) and a package.json description identifying itself as a 'bug-bounty research placeholder — Convera', published under the @convera/* scope to match a private internal namespace. Any installer who resolves this name (accidental scope resolution, misconfigured registry, or a legitimate Convera dev pulling the public registry version) silently leaks host identifiers to a third-party Collaborator endpoint with no opt-in and no functional code in return. Regardless of the author's stated research intent, this is unauthorized data collection from every installer and a dependency-confusion attack surface against the Convera organization.

The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@convera/ui-shared' @ 0.0.2 (npm) as malicious.

It is considered malicious because:

The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

0.0.20.0.3

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

647502d33492bf942a8b0bd468f7420ebca797820c7a47ac74c238c35ae08bff

271ce9a862ed30273cb6240b1332324bdfcff1d46c231cd197b94105aa8cf96f

3fa0960816c1204042cecc61c5337e5db2c1407f5325cfc2ed26e43b5dc054d0

4b8662e0a23d1d0110e235efc29c0716b04716640dc11185ecf727447c699667

Detection & response playbook

Malicious package

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @convera/ui-shared (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @convera/ui-shared across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @convera/ui-shared from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @convera/ui-shared was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @convera/ui-shared before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @convera/ui-shared on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.0.2, 0.0.3 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-002775IN-MAL-2026-002776IN-MAL-2026-002725

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @convera/ui-shared-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring