@catamania/ui-componentsnpm
Malicious code in @catamania/ui-components (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package declares a postinstall lifecycle hook ("postinstall": "node postinstall.js" in package.json) that runs automatically during npm install. postinstall.js (lines 1-22) collects os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, process.cwd(), and the entire process.env object, JSON-serializes them, and POSTs the payload over HTTPS to attacker.appsec.cc:9999/exfiltrate. On developer workstations and CI runners, process.env routinely contains high-value secrets (NPM_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID/AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, CI provider tokens, database URLs). Errors are swallowed silently, a classic exfiltration-stealth technique. The package self-describes as internal UI components, which provides no legitimate justification for reading or transmitting environment variables. This is an unambiguous credential-theft supply-chain attack against the installer.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @catamania/ui-components (version 1.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @catamania/ui-components across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@catamania/ui-components is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @catamania/ui-components was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @catamania/ui-components before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @catamania/ui-components-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.