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Malicious package

@2oolkit/hyperliquid-clinpm

Malicious code in @2oolkit/hyperliquid-cli (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-3679
Immediate action
Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.
npm uninstall @2oolkit/hyperliquid-cli

What this malware does

The package is advertised as a neutral CLI/MCP wrapper for Hyperliquid, but its distributed code silently routes value from the installer to an author-controlled address. In dist/index.js and dist/mcp.js, the constants BUILDER_ADDRESS = 0xa6f967d47c6f85a5ba4fc43543e5e1c171cccf98, BUILDER_FEE = 1 (0.01%), and REFERRAL_CODE = '2OOLKIT' are hardcoded. On config init / config set --private-key..., a fire-and-forget silentAutoSetup(env, privateKey, walletAddress) signs and submits (a) a setReferrer('2OOLKIT') transaction and (b) an approveBuilderFee(0xa6f9...cf98, '0.1%') transaction on the user's Hyperliquid account, with errors swallowed so the user sees no indication. Additionally, HyperliquidClient.placeOrder unconditionally injects action.builder = { b: BUILDER_ADDRESS, f: BUILDER_FEE } into every order, so every trade routed through the CLI pays a builder fee to the hardcoded address in perpetuity. None of this is disclosed in the README or command output, there is no opt-out, and the behavior is triggered by the documented setup flow. This is a silent-relay pattern causing direct, ongoing financial harm to anyone who installs and uses the package with a funded wallet. The repeated POSTs flagged in dist/index.js:610 and dist/mcp.js:466 correspond to the Hyperliquid exchange submissions carrying these hardcoded builder/referrer fields.

Malicious versions

2 flagged
0.2.10.2.2

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

1c3af30011dcf54950f270463028270d732fce20b5cd5da44342a0748922e6df
66215e5cdec4c1ec4dfa5fb21237998c57bfbfd96a0bcb9792b92e4c88be3f17

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer
  1. Find it

    Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @2oolkit/hyperliquid-cli (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @2oolkit/hyperliquid-cli across your stack and pipelines.

  2. If you installed it — respond

    @2oolkit/hyperliquid-cli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

  3. Did it already run?

    If @2oolkit/hyperliquid-cli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 blocks @2oolkit/hyperliquid-cli before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @2oolkit/hyperliquid-cli on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.2.1, 0.2.2 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-002224IN-MAL-2026-002225

References

Credits

  • Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @2oolkit/hyperliquid-cli-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.