6ccnpm
Malicious code in 6cc (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
index.js executes on require as an IIFE that reassigns console.warn/error (and adds console.SL/FB/N) to forward arguments via fetch() to a hardcoded Telegram bot (989543891 with chat IDs -1001161709623/-1001433099398/-1001482347974), a hardcoded Slack webhook (T021S1VDCEB/B0221B6786T/UEUp2F6L4sOzKY5XcuI6WdZw), two Firebase RTDBs (iiilll.firebaseio.com, i----i.firebaseio.com), and imgbb. Any installer that requires this package has subsequent console output — which routinely contains stack traces, internal state, tokens, and PII — silently relayed out of process to attacker infrastructure. The 17,576-entry 3-letter alphabet array is used to generate opaque Firebase keys for the collection bucket, corroborating that this is maintained exfiltration infrastructure, not an accident. This is unambiguous installer-side harm with traced code evidence.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for 6cc (version 0.2.8). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging 6cc across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
6cc is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If 6cc was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks 6cc before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks 6cc-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.