66onpm
Malicious code in 66o (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On require(), index.js replaces the global console object with a Proxy (index.js:36-73) that intercepts console.error/info/warn calls anywhere in the host process and POSTs their serialized content (up to 4090 chars) to https://api.telegram.org/bot<redacted-token>/sendMessage?chat_id=5043676235. It additionally installs a process.on('uncaughtException', err => console.error(err)) handler (index.js:3-10), ensuring that any uncaught exception in the installer's application — which commonly includes file paths, environment values, SQL fragments, and request payloads in stack traces — is routed through the same exfiltration channel to an author-controlled Telegram chat. A secondary global U/F function (index.js:75-83) writes caller-supplied objects to an author-owned Firebase Realtime Database (iiilll.firebaseio.com). The hardcoded Telegram bot token and imgbb API key in the source are the credentials backing this relay, not merely author-leaked secrets. Any consumer that requires this package silently has their log and error stream piped to a third party without consent — a textbook silent-relay / data exfiltration supply-chain attack.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for 66o (6 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging 66o across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
66o is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If 66o was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks 66o before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks 66o-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.