3pool-sushibarnpm
Malicious code in 3pool-sushibar (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
This package is a dependency-chain dropper. package.json declares 15 undocumented dependencies in three numbered families (web3chain02032*, rusttool0701*, btc202523*) pinned to ^1.1.1, none of which appear in the README that describes a standalone Go miner. The bundled tranpack.sh proves the campaign: an infinite loop that rewrites package.json's name from a ~500-word crypto/DeFi wordlist and runs npm publish, and the current name 3pool-sushibar is an output of that generator. The package itself is non-functional — the declared main entry index.js does not exist — confirming that its only purpose is to pull in attacker-controlled siblings. Two undocumented 22MB Windows.exe binaries with mismatched hashes further contradict the README's source-only build story. Running npm install 3pool-sushibar fetches 15 attacker-controlled packages whose code is one hop away from inspection here; this is direct installer harm via namespace-abuse plus typosquat lure.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for 3pool-sushibar (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging 3pool-sushibar across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
3pool-sushibar establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If 3pool-sushibar was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks 3pool-sushibar before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks 3pool-sushibar-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.