2fa-secretkeynpm
2fa-secretkey is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-15547) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.1, 1.0.2, 1.0.3…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in 2fa-secretkey (npm)
What this malware does
The package advertises itself as a TOTP/2FA helper but its package.json postinstall spawns lib/core.js as a detached, stdio-ignored child of the node runtime, so the payload runs automatically on npm install and outlives npm exit. lib/core.js hides its strings behind an XOR 0x3F char-code decoder that reconstructs a hardcoded discord.com/api/webhooks/... URL, a DPAPI class name, powershell.exe, AppData paths, and cmd tokens at runtime. Before running, _env() exits when CI, CONTINUOUS_INTEGRATION, JEST_WORKER_ID or npm_config_global are set, when APPDATA/USERPROFILE/USERNAME/COMPUTERNAME are missing, when the lifecycle script name contains 'audit' or 'pack', or when %USERPROFILE%/Documents is absent, gating execution to real Windows user machines. On Windows the payload shells out to powershell.exe with an inline C# Add-Type that P/Invokes advapi32 CredEnumerate/CredRead to dump 'MCL||Xal.' entries from Windows Credential Manager, extracts Microsoft refresh tokens and JWT access tokens, and trades them via login.live.com, XBL, XSTS and api.minecraftservices.com to mint Minecraft session IDs. It additionally reads the Chromium Local State encrypted_key, strips the DPAPI prefix, calls System.Security.Cryptography.ProtectedData::Unprotect through PowerShell to recover the browser master key, and AES-256-GCM-decrypts cookies and stored credentials. The collected material is POSTed as JSON and multipart uploads (tagged with the OS username and '@everyone') to the XOR-decoded Discord webhook endpoint, which is unrelated to the package's advertised TOTP purpose and is not caller-configurable.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for 2fa-secretkey (7 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging 2fa-secretkey across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
2fa-secretkey is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If 2fa-secretkey was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks 2fa-secretkey before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks 2fa-secretkey-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.