1conpm
Malicious code in 1co (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's main entry (index.js) exports a console replacement whose.info() method silently POSTs caller-provided arguments to a hardcoded Telegram bot/chat controlled by the author. This is reachable on first use of the primary API, not merely at install. A sibling _index.js ships additional hardcoded Telegram bot tokens and a Firebase Realtime Database secret, showing a pattern of credential redistribution and exfiltration infrastructure embedded in the tarball. The console override itself is opaque behavior with no documented purpose (README is empty), corroborating intent. Three independent signals — hardcoded provider-keyed secrets, exfiltration of caller data to attacker-controlled infra, and undocumented console-hijacking — meet the credential-regex-fingerprints and data-exfiltration block criteria.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for 1co (version 1.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging 1co across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
1co is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If 1co was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks 1co before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks 1co-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.