1cat-tunnel-client-zxnpm
Malicious code in 1cat-tunnel-client-zx (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, the package's postinstall hook (node install.js) fetches a platform-specific executable from http://156.226.174.161:8888/binaries/tunnel-client-* over plaintext HTTP, writes it to the package's bin/ directory, and chmod 0755s it. The download URL is hardcoded to a bare IP address, uses cleartext HTTP (no TLS), is not pinned to a version, and the fetched bytes are never hash- or signature-verified before being made executable. The cli.js fallback performs the same unverified download on first CLI invocation if the binary is missing. Any on-path network attacker between the installer and 156.226.174.161 — or any future operator of that IP — can substitute arbitrary native code that will then run on the installer's machine. The destination is not a known runtime CDN, not the package publisher's own infrastructure, and the package's stated purpose (a tunnel client) does not justify forgoing TLS or integrity verification. Separately, the README ships plaintext admin credentials for the author's own tunnel server, which is author self-harm and not the basis for this block.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for 1cat-tunnel-client-zx (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging 1cat-tunnel-client-zx across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
1cat-tunnel-client-zx is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If 1cat-tunnel-client-zx was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks 1cat-tunnel-client-zx before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks 1cat-tunnel-client-zx-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.