@zzzgenesis00/web3-provider-enginenpm
@zzzgenesis00/web3-provider-engine is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11994) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 16.0.5). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @zzzgenesis00/web3-provider-engine (npm)
What this malware does
Package impersonates MetaMask's web3-provider-engine (author field 'MetaMask', homepage pointing to github.com/MetaMask/web3-provider-engine) while shipping a postinstall.js that runs automatically on npm install and harvests installer secrets. postinstall.js reads ~/.ssh contents, ~/.npmrc, ~/.gitconfig, Chrome/Firefox profile databases (Cookies, Login Data, key4.db), enumerates crypto wallet directories (.bitcoin,.ethereum,.metamask,.exodus, and others), invokes npm whoami and git config, and captures roughly 30 credential-shaped environment variables including NPM_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, AWS keys, PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC, SEED_PHRASE, and multiple chain-specific *_PRIVATE_KEY values. The collected data is JSON-serialized and transmitted to two hardcoded non-first-party destinations: api.telegram.org/bot<token>/sendMessage via GET with a hardcoded bot token and chat_id, and https://40f955f39128bd79-178-249-214-24.serveousercontent.com/collect via POST. index.js provides a stub web3 API surface (createWallet, generateMnemonic returning random bytes) to appear functional and disguise the harvest.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @zzzgenesis00/web3-provider-engine (version 16.0.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @zzzgenesis00/web3-provider-engine across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@zzzgenesis00/web3-provider-engine is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @zzzgenesis00/web3-provider-engine was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @zzzgenesis00/web3-provider-engine before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @zzzgenesis00/web3-provider-engine-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.