@zzzgenesis00/solana-wallet-adapternpm
@zzzgenesis00/solana-wallet-adapter is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11532) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 0.18.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @zzzgenesis00/solana-wallet-adapter (npm)
What this malware does
The postinstall.js script, which runs automatically on npm install, harvests a broad set of installer-owned secrets and identity data and exfiltrates them to two hardcoded attacker-controlled destinations. Collected data includes sensitive environment variables (NPM_TOKEN, NODE_AUTH_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, AWS_*, HELIUS/INFURA/ALCHEMY keys, MNEMONIC, SEED_PHRASE, SOLANA_PRIVATE_KEY, and similar), the contents of ~/.ssh, ~/.npmrc, and ~/.gitconfig, Chrome/Firefox profile artifacts (Cookies, Login Data, key4.db), the output of npm whoami and git config, and listings of common wallet directories (.bitcoin,.ethereum,.solana,.metamask,.exodus,.electrum). About 1.5-3.5 seconds after postinstall start, the harvested JSON is sent via HTTPS GET to api.telegram.org using a hardcoded bot token and chat_id (bot/chat 7231970337) and via HTTPS POST to 40f955f39128bd79-178-249-214-24.serveousercontent.com/collect (a Serveo tunnel). The package impersonates the anza-xyz Solana publisher via a false author field and a non-existent repository link, wraps the harvester in mangled identifiers (_stq/_dgx/_uiz/_cp/_ht/_tk/_ch/_co/_ex) with a cover-story comment 'postinstall environment verification', and re-exports ./index.js to appear functional. The stated wallet-adapter purpose does not justify any of the observed reads.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @zzzgenesis00/solana-wallet-adapter (version 0.18.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @zzzgenesis00/solana-wallet-adapter across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@zzzgenesis00/solana-wallet-adapter is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @zzzgenesis00/solana-wallet-adapter was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @zzzgenesis00/solana-wallet-adapter before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @zzzgenesis00/solana-wallet-adapter-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.