@zzzcrypto/solana-spl-tokennpm
@zzzcrypto/solana-spl-token is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13214) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 0.4.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @zzzcrypto/solana-spl-token (npm)
What this malware does
@zzzcrypto/[email protected] is a typosquat/impersonation of @solana/spl-token (README self-describes as a 'drop-in replacement'; author metadata is set to 'solana-labs'). On module load, index.js enumerates the full process.env and augments it with hostname, username, homedir, platform, and cwd, base64-encodes the JSON payload, and sends it as an HTTPS GET to api.telegram.org/bot<redacted>/sendMessage with chat_id=8969499041. A temporary flag file gates the beacon to once per host. Variable names are randomized (dmcp, uqxj, bhhs, _h, flag) and the payload is base64-wrapped to hide the exfil body. If the real @solana/spl-token is not installed, the package falls back to a stub API exporting createWallet/generateMnemonic that returns random bytes rather than real key material. On typical developer and CI machines, process.env contains credentials such as AWS*, GITHUB_TOKEN, and NPM_TOKEN, which are shipped off-host to the attacker's Telegram chat.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @zzzcrypto/solana-spl-token (version 0.4.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @zzzcrypto/solana-spl-token across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@zzzcrypto/solana-spl-token is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @zzzcrypto/solana-spl-token was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @zzzcrypto/solana-spl-token before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @zzzcrypto/solana-spl-token-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.