@zizie071/libsignal-nodenpm
Malicious code in @zizie071/libsignal-node (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On require(), index.js schedules install.js which locates the installer's @whiskeysockets/baileys package on disk and overwrites lib/Socket/newsletter.js with an embedded payload (MODIFIED_NEWSLETTER_JS). The injected code fetches a JSON list from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pipih071/SilenceV3/refs/heads/main/ch.json (a mutable, attacker-controlled raw GitHub URL) and uses the installer's authenticated WhatsApp session to silently auto-follow channels listed in that file. install.js writes a marker file (.cache containing 'Iove') under Baileys' node_modules to track the patch and calls process.exit(0) after patching to mask the side effect. The package self-identifies as 'Open Whisper Systems' libsignal for Node.js' under the @zizie071 scope, mimicking the well-known libsignal-node library API surface (SessionBuilder, SessionCipher, etc.) so unsuspecting developers pull it in as a drop-in replacement. Three independent supply-chain harms are present: (1) cross-package tampering — the package mutates a sibling vendor's installed source on the installer's machine, (2) attacker-controlled remote behavior — the patched code reads a mutable URL on each run so the attacker can change targeted channels at any time, (3) namespace abuse / impersonation of a well-known cryptography library to deliver the payload.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @zizie071/libsignal-node (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @zizie071/libsignal-node across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@zizie071/libsignal-node is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @zizie071/libsignal-node, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If @zizie071/libsignal-node was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @zizie071/libsignal-node before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @zizie071/libsignal-node-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.