@zimmo/last_searchnpm
Malicious code in @zimmo/last_search (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's preinstall hook runs index.js on every npm install. The script collects host identity data — os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, __dirname, process.cwd(), and the package name — and ships it two ways: (1) hex-encoded into a DNS subdomain resolved against *.d8jbmnsqcfu78dfs8vdg34ohqhirb4pbg.oast.live (an interactsh out-of-band canary), and (2) POSTed as JSON to the hardcoded bare IP http://172.201.213.59:9090/c. The package has no legitimate functionality — index.js is an exfiltration-only payload. The inflated 99.0.0 version under the @zimmo scope, combined with the "security research" description and recon-only payload, is the canonical dependency-confusion shape: if a build pipeline at Zimmo (or a misconfigured installer) resolves the @zimmo/last_search name from the public npm registry instead of an internal one, the attacker receives internal hostnames, usernames, and install paths as reconnaissance for a follow-on attack.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@zimmo/last_search' @ 99.0.1 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @zimmo/last_search (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @zimmo/last_search across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@zimmo/last_search is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @zimmo/last_search was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @zimmo/last_search before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @zimmo/last_search-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.