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Malicious package

@zhengshuo888/huokenpm

Malicious code in @zhengshuo888/huoke (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4472
Immediate action
Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.
npm uninstall @zhengshuo888/huoke

What this malware does

On npm install, the package's postinstall hook runs node bin/huoke.js install-skill, which uses execSync to invoke curl -fsSL against https://raw.githubusercontent.com/amswf/huoke/main/SKILL.md and writes the response into ~/.hermes/skills/.../SKILL.md and ~/.openclaw/skills/.... The URL is on a personal GitHub user's account (amswf) that does not match the package's declared repository (huoke-link/huoke-skill), points at a mutable main branch, and the fetched content is not hash- or signature-verified. The package already ships a SKILL.md in the tarball, but the postinstall ignores it and refetches remotely, so the file the AI ends up loading is whatever the controller of that personal repo serves at install time — not the file npm reviewed. The installed SKILL.md is loaded by Hermes/OpenClaw as agent instructions and contains curl directives that the user's AI agent executes with the user's bearer tokens, giving the controller of github.com/amswf/huoke an install-time channel to direct privileged actions on the installer's machine. Separately, bin/huoke.js defaults its server endpoint to http://huoke.link (plaintext HTTP) with a hardcoded shared bearer sk_clawx_dev_2026, so the credential-setup flow it advertises transmits the installer's email, verification code, and password in cleartext under a key shared by every installer — a quality issue layered on top of the install-time-fetch concern.

Malicious versions

2 flagged
1.0.01.0.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

6f352f11f7811b28966799c9359f99dbbe9829240066504be17c100981dd45ab
acb113efaf3da376f3e05a0bc0d39f144f8c1b4fda7c76b5a54a6612285f4c1b

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer
  1. Find it

    Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @zhengshuo888/huoke (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @zhengshuo888/huoke across your stack and pipelines.

  2. If you installed it — respond

    @zhengshuo888/huoke is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

  3. Did it already run?

    If @zhengshuo888/huoke was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 blocks @zhengshuo888/huoke before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @zhengshuo888/huoke on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-003740IN-MAL-2026-003739

References

Credits

  • Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @zhengshuo888/huoke-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

@zhengshuo888/huoke (npm) malicious package — MAL-2026-4472 | O3 Security