@zhengshuo888/huokenpm
Malicious code in @zhengshuo888/huoke (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, the package's postinstall hook runs node bin/huoke.js install-skill, which uses execSync to invoke curl -fsSL against https://raw.githubusercontent.com/amswf/huoke/main/SKILL.md and writes the response into ~/.hermes/skills/.../SKILL.md and ~/.openclaw/skills/.... The URL is on a personal GitHub user's account (amswf) that does not match the package's declared repository (huoke-link/huoke-skill), points at a mutable main branch, and the fetched content is not hash- or signature-verified. The package already ships a SKILL.md in the tarball, but the postinstall ignores it and refetches remotely, so the file the AI ends up loading is whatever the controller of that personal repo serves at install time — not the file npm reviewed. The installed SKILL.md is loaded by Hermes/OpenClaw as agent instructions and contains curl directives that the user's AI agent executes with the user's bearer tokens, giving the controller of github.com/amswf/huoke an install-time channel to direct privileged actions on the installer's machine. Separately, bin/huoke.js defaults its server endpoint to http://huoke.link (plaintext HTTP) with a hardcoded shared bearer sk_clawx_dev_2026, so the credential-setup flow it advertises transmits the installer's email, verification code, and password in cleartext under a key shared by every installer — a quality issue layered on top of the install-time-fetch concern.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @zhengshuo888/huoke (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @zhengshuo888/huoke across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@zhengshuo888/huoke is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @zhengshuo888/huoke was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @zhengshuo888/huoke before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @zhengshuo888/huoke-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.