@zanta/baileysnpm
Advisory published Updated
@zanta/baileys is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-17443) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @zanta/baileys (npm)
What this malware does
This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library (npm) and belongs to the "PhantomSub" family described by OX Security in September 2026: the publisher injected code that, without the installer asking, uses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to subscribe that account to WhatsApp Channels (newsletters) the publisher chose, by sending the WhatsApp w:mex FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) for each target channel JID.
package/lib/Socket/socket.js line 23 declares the plain-literal AUTO_FOLLOW_CHANNEL_JID = "120363406265537739@newsletter"; lines 769-794, in the login-success (CB:success) handler, wait 3 seconds after the connection opens and send a FOLLOW query (xwa2_newsletter_join_v2) for it (cited line 774: QueryIds.FOLLOW,), suppressing "already subscribed" errors. There is no opt-out. The package README describes the fork as one from which "annoying developer auto-follow newsletter scripts have been completely stripped", which the shipped code contradicts.
Line numbers refer to version 1.0.1; the same code is present in every published version listed under affected.
Static review of the published tarball(s) found no code that sends WhatsApp credentials or session keys off-host, no install-time payload (the only install hook is Baileys' stock Node.js version check in engine-requirements.js), and no persistence; the payload runs when an application creates a WhatsApp socket with the library. The harm is the covert use of the victim's account to inflate the publisher's channel subscribers.
SHA-256 of the published npm tarball(s): 1.0.0: c88f9688c56742da9b149da3c41df88da47fe95073ad581a716fc4c11ee199f3; 1.0.1: dc0eb5fcdfa84de88afe9eaf4bea9d6360fa984797599a1b7d7737df1d341c2a.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @zanta/baileys (2 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
@zanta/baileys is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @zanta/baileys was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Rising Sun Solutions LLC · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @zanta/baileys-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.