@zannstore/baileysnpm
@zannstore/baileys is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11179) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 2.2.6, 2.2.7, 2.2.8…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @zannstore/baileys (npm)
What this malware does
@zannstore/baileys is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library. A a static rule fired on lib/Utils/generics.js due to keyword co-occurrence of 'ping', 'GET', and 'id' in the same file, but these tokens correspond to the library's normal protocol-level operations (WhatsApp WebSocket ping/keepalive and message id handling), not to shell execution or exfiltration. No install/postinstall lifecycle script fetches or executes external content, no hardcoded attacker C2 endpoint is bound to a network sink, no reads of installer secret paths (~/.aws, ~/.ssh, ~/.npmrc, browser stores) are present, and no dropper, backdoor, or silent-relay mechanism is observed against the installer.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @zannstore/baileys (17 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @zannstore/baileys across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@zannstore/baileys is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @zannstore/baileys was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @zannstore/baileys before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @zannstore/baileys-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.