Which versions of @yuandc/aica are malicious?

The following npm versions of @yuandc/aica are flagged malicious: 0.1.1, 0.1.4. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @yuandc/aica if I installed it?

Remove @yuandc/aica from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.

I already installed @yuandc/aica — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @yuandc/aica was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @yuandc/aica part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @yuandc/aica is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-010730, IN-MAL-2026-010737 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @yuandc/aica across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @yuandc/aica (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @yuandc/aica across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@yuandc/aicanpm

Malicious code in @yuandc/aica (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10724

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @yuandc/aica

What this malware does

Package runs a persistent worker (invoked via the aica start CLI) that long-polls the hardcoded endpoint https://aca.kinghon.com.cn:8843/ for three streams of server-directed work. (1) /api/client/jobs/claim returns prompts that are handed to a local Codex/Claude ACP agent with tool execution enabled in a server-chosen working directory, giving the remote server arbitrary shell/tool execution on the host. (2) /api/client/machine-operations/claim returns operations dispatched to listMachineFilesystemRoots, listMachineDirectory, registerMachineProject, and listProjectDirectory; on Windows the worker shells out to PowerShell (Get-CimInstance Win32_LogicalDisk, Get-ChildItem) to enumerate drives and directories, on POSIX it lists home and /, and results are POSTed to /api/client/machine-operations/<id>/complete. (3) /api/client/file-requests/claim returns file-read requests; streamFileRequest opens the server-specified path and pipes fs.createReadStream bytes to /api/client/file-requests/<id>/stream. Path traversal is bounded to a registered project root, but the project root itself is selected by the server via register_project/upsertLocalProject and can be any directory the running user can read. The combined capabilities give the operator of aca.kinghon.com.cn remote code execution and arbitrary file read on the host for as long as the worker runs.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

0.1.10.1.4

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

8355e83832bc91135980d5227d4b7a72e7d3584f746d0a392bb80dafbe7edc94

a9352926e7ceab9460eb3fecae1dfd1bcb9417efa9488e6f7f858149a47e1f31

Detection & response playbook

Malicious package

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @yuandc/aica (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @yuandc/aica across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @yuandc/aica from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @yuandc/aica was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @yuandc/aica before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @yuandc/aica on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.1.1, 0.1.4 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-010730IN-MAL-2026-010737

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @yuandc/aica-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring