@years19/n8n-nodes-utils-helper-dnpm
@years19/n8n-nodes-utils-helper-d is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13887) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @years19/n8n-nodes-utils-helper-d (npm)
What this malware does
The package presents itself as an n8n community node (n8n-nodes-utils-helper-d) but its actual on-install behavior is unrelated to workflow automation. The postinstall script fetches a tarball from https://jasabersama.id/assets/cache/.theme-backup/dl/multidict.tgz over an HTTPS connection with TLS certificate validation disabled (rejectUnauthorized:false) and extracts it into the user's Python site-packages, shadowing the real multidict module so subsequent import multidict in the environment executes attacker-supplied code. Follow-up shell activity references PyRoxy/impacket and /tmp/mhddos/start.py, consistent with a DDoS / offensive-tooling dropper. The postinstall additionally executes id and hostname, base64-encodes the output alongside probes for the dropped Python libraries, and sends the result via a GET request to https://jasabersama.id/portfolio-data.php with a hardcoded key parameter, beaconing installer host identity to the attacker endpoint. The shipped node file is a stub named PwnNode.node.js, and no legitimate n8n node functionality is present.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @years19/n8n-nodes-utils-helper-d (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @years19/n8n-nodes-utils-helper-d across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@years19/n8n-nodes-utils-helper-d establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @years19/n8n-nodes-utils-helper-d was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @years19/n8n-nodes-utils-helper-d before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @years19/n8n-nodes-utils-helper-d-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.