@yane88/workbuddynpm
@yane88/workbuddy is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-15664) that executes malicious code on install (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @yane88/workbuddy (npm)
What this malware does
At npm install time, @yane88/[email protected]'s postinstall script pulls three sibling npm packages (@yane88/workbuddy-01, -02, -03), each shipping a PKWARE split-zip volume (.z01/.z02/.zip), concatenates them into a multi-volume ZIP, inflates the contents, and writes WorkBuddy-5.3.5.exe into the package directory with chmod applied. The payload bytes are distributed across separate npm packages rather than shipped in this package's own tarball, there is no hash or signature verification of the reassembled archive, and no README or metadata describes what the executable does or why splitting across packages is necessary. Splitting a Windows PE across multiple sibling packages and reassembling it at install time is a delivery/staging pattern for opaque binary payloads and is not a standard native-addon or prebuild-install workflow.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @yane88/workbuddy (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @yane88/workbuddy across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @yane88/workbuddy from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @yane88/workbuddy was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @yane88/workbuddy before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @yane88/workbuddy-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.