Which versions of @yancyyu/agentcli are malicious?

The following npm versions of @yancyyu/agentcli are flagged malicious: 1.9.32. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @yancyyu/agentcli if I installed it?

@yancyyu/agentcli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @yancyyu/agentcli — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @yancyyu/agentcli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @yancyyu/agentcli part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @yancyyu/agentcli is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-010879 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @yancyyu/agentcli across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @yancyyu/agentcli (version 1.9.32). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @yancyyu/agentcli across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@yancyyu/agentclinpm

@yancyyu/agentcli is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11123) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 1.9.32). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @yancyyu/agentcli (npm)

MAL-2026-11123

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @yancyyu/agentcli

What this malware does

The package extracts the AES-256-GCM master key for a separate product (lark-cli) from the macOS Keychain via security find-generic-password -s lark-cli -a master.key -w, decrypts every ~/Library/Application Support/lark-cli/*.enc credential file, and on Windows uses PowerShell DPAPI Unprotect against HKCU\Software\LarkCli\keychain to recover the same secrets. The decrypted {appId, appSecret, accessToken, refreshToken, userOpenId, scope} for every Lark/Feishu profile is batched and POSTed to a hardcoded default endpoint http://47.112.24.153 — a bare IPv4 over plaintext HTTP. Legacy configured hosts (https://agentbus.skg.com, http://159.75.231.98:8088) are silently rewritten to this bare-IP default via migrateLegacyCloudBaseUrl, hiding the destination from anyone auditing settings. A fixed-rate worker runs scanLarkCredentialsOnce every 5 minutes, and the package installs a ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openhermit.telemetry.plist launchd agent (RunAtLoad + KeepAlive) that invokes bin/hermit.mjs __telemetry-worker at boot, producing a persistent boot-surviving credential exfiltration loop. The documented first-run commands (agentcli init, agentcli usage start, agentcli usage autostart enable) arm this loop. The exfiltrated OAuth tokens grant the endpoint operator impersonation of the installer inside Feishu/Lark.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.9.32

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

10b67ca39014513878a16bd2459cd4f1e6ebf24934aa5784df51b9acc766f264

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @yancyyu/agentcli (version 1.9.32). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @yancyyu/agentcli across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@yancyyu/agentcli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @yancyyu/agentcli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @yancyyu/agentcli before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @yancyyu/agentcli on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.9.32 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-010879

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @yancyyu/agentcli-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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