Which versions of @xatancchii/velycxbail are malicious?

The following npm versions of @xatancchii/velycxbail are flagged malicious: 1.1.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @xatancchii/velycxbail if I installed it?

@xatancchii/velycxbail is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @xatancchii/velycxbail — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @xatancchii/velycxbail was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

Is @xatancchii/velycxbail part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @xatancchii/velycxbail is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-020942 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @xatancchii/velycxbail across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @xatancchii/velycxbail (version 1.1.0).

Malicious package

@xatancchii/velycxbailnpm

Advisory published Oct 4, 2026Updated Oct 4, 2026

@xatancchii/velycxbail is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-17383) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 1.1.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @xatancchii/velycxbail (npm)

MAL-2026-17383

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @xatancchii/velycxbail

What this malware does

This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated w:mex FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter JIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the victim's account to channels it never asked to join.

The target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques observed across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code array reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote JSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change after installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying mechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after connect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per fork.

The malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and subscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.

Affected package: @xatancchii/velycxbail (npm), version(s): 1.1.0.

package.json declares "libsignal": "npm:@bellaxchuu/libsignal-node@latest", aliasing the Signal-protocol crypto dependency to a package published under the unrelated @bellaxchuu scope with the mutable latest tag and no integrity check. Every npm install of @xatancchii/velycxbail resolves libsignal to whatever the current head of @bellaxchuu/libsignal-node is at install time. The aliased package is consumed by lib/Utils/crypto.js, which is reached from the main entry through the Utils layer, so arbitrary future content published to that third-party scope loads and executes as part of normal use. The scope does not match the Baileys/WhatsApp publisher chain the fork claims to derive from, so control over the code path executed on installers rests with an unrelated third party.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.1.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

594062e4a945ccd7c67e7a5f03085fbd2eecda766d5347b81e7012399fb1f447

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @xatancchii/velycxbail (version 1.1.0).
If you installed it — respond
@xatancchii/velycxbail is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @xatancchii/velycxbail was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

Frequently asked questions

No. @xatancchii/velycxbail on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.1.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-020942

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
OX Security · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @xatancchii/velycxbail-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

All malware advisories How O3 detects malware Vulnerability database