Which versions of @wrenfield/viem are malicious?

The following npm versions of @wrenfield/viem are flagged malicious: 2.53.4. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @wrenfield/viem if I installed it?

@wrenfield/viem is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @wrenfield/viem, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.

I already installed @wrenfield/viem — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @wrenfield/viem was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @wrenfield/viem part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @wrenfield/viem is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-010485 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @wrenfield/viem across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @wrenfield/viem (version 2.53.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @wrenfield/viem across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@wrenfield/viemnpm

Malicious code in @wrenfield/viem (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10571

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @wrenfield/viem

What this malware does

Package @wrenfield/viem impersonates the popular viem library (homepage viem.sh, repo wevm/viem); README and authors fields credit the real viem maintainers but the package itself is published under an unrelated @wrenfield scope. The shipped source under _cjs/ mirrors viem's real code, but package.json rewrites the abitype dependency via npm alias: "abitype": "npm:@wrenfield/[email protected]". The CommonJS entry _cjs/index.js calls require("abitype") at module load, so any installer who require()s or imports @wrenfield/viem transitively pulls and executes code from @wrenfield/[email protected] — a separate package under the same attacker-controlled scope, outside this tarball. The combination of brand impersonation of a top npm package plus a silent dependency redirect to an attacker-controlled namespace is the namespace-abuse / dependency-hijack pattern: the lure package looks legitimate on inspection, while the actual payload is delivered through the redirected dependency at first import.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

2.53.4

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

fa26048a977a00adcd1ffc42ccf06110e3807bb2a3145a01fd01318dcfe79771

Detection & response playbook

Typosquat

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @wrenfield/viem (version 2.53.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @wrenfield/viem across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@wrenfield/viem is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @wrenfield/viem, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If @wrenfield/viem was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @wrenfield/viem before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @wrenfield/viem on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 2.53.4 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-010485

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @wrenfield/viem-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring