@wrenfield/abitypenpm
@wrenfield/abitype is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10529) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious versions 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.6…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @wrenfield/abitype (npm)
What this malware does
Package @wrenfield/abitype impersonates the well-known wevm/abitype library: it copies the upstream README verbatim (links to abitype.dev, wevm.eth, contributors awkweb.eth and jxom.eth) and retains "repository": "wevm/abitype" in package.json, while publishing under an unrelated @wrenfield scope. Two import-reachable files in the published tarball — dist/cjs/human-readable/runtime/utils.js (line 238 onward) and dist/esm/exports/index.js (line 19 onward) — carry an obfuscator.io payload (RC4-decoded ~580-entry string array, control-flow flattening, anti-debug self-defending) appended after the legitimate abitype source. The decoded payload dynamically loads node http/https, issues a GET to a runtime-constructed remote endpoint with a custom User-Agent, follows 301/302/303/307/308 redirects, writes the response to disk, fs.chmodSync's it to 0o755, and executes the bytes via spawn(process.execPath,..., {detached:true, stdio:'ignore'}) and via spawn('sh', ['-c',...]). Because dist/cjs/human-readable/runtime/utils.js is reached through the package's main entry (parseAbiItem → utils) and the file is listed in package.json sideEffects, the downloader fires automatically on require('@wrenfield/abitype') / import. Installing or loading this package runs attacker-controlled code on the installer's machine.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @wrenfield/abitype (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @wrenfield/abitype across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@wrenfield/abitype is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @wrenfield/abitype, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If @wrenfield/abitype was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @wrenfield/abitype before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @wrenfield/abitype-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.