Which versions of @wrenfield/abitype are malicious?

The following npm versions of @wrenfield/abitype are flagged malicious: 1.2.6, 1.2.7. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @wrenfield/abitype if I installed it?

@wrenfield/abitype is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @wrenfield/abitype, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.

I already installed @wrenfield/abitype — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @wrenfield/abitype was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @wrenfield/abitype part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @wrenfield/abitype is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-010368, IN-MAL-2026-010369 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @wrenfield/abitype across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @wrenfield/abitype (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @wrenfield/abitype across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@wrenfield/abitypenpm

Malicious code in @wrenfield/abitype (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10529

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @wrenfield/abitype

What this malware does

Package @wrenfield/abitype impersonates the well-known wevm/abitype library: it copies the upstream README verbatim (links to abitype.dev, wevm.eth, contributors awkweb.eth and jxom.eth) and retains "repository": "wevm/abitype" in package.json, while publishing under an unrelated @wrenfield scope. Two import-reachable files in the published tarball — dist/cjs/human-readable/runtime/utils.js (line 238 onward) and dist/esm/exports/index.js (line 19 onward) — carry an obfuscator.io payload (RC4-decoded ~580-entry string array, control-flow flattening, anti-debug self-defending) appended after the legitimate abitype source. The decoded payload dynamically loads node http/https, issues a GET to a runtime-constructed remote endpoint with a custom User-Agent, follows 301/302/303/307/308 redirects, writes the response to disk, fs.chmodSync's it to 0o755, and executes the bytes via spawn(process.execPath,..., {detached:true, stdio:'ignore'}) and via spawn('sh', ['-c',...]). Because dist/cjs/human-readable/runtime/utils.js is reached through the package's main entry (parseAbiItem → utils) and the file is listed in package.json sideEffects, the downloader fires automatically on require('@wrenfield/abitype') / import. Installing or loading this package runs attacker-controlled code on the installer's machine.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

1.2.61.2.7

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

1d1b16f2fdde2184bdcfb6f2c91f18c328dee9aa1bb111f86d3130f47c42c9e5

d17fa68b111487d52ed28d929960dfeea69a80d2f65f2c8cb86d820c2b986be1

Detection & response playbook

Typosquat

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @wrenfield/abitype (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @wrenfield/abitype across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@wrenfield/abitype is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @wrenfield/abitype, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If @wrenfield/abitype was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @wrenfield/abitype before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @wrenfield/abitype on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.2.6, 1.2.7 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-010368IN-MAL-2026-010369

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @wrenfield/abitype-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring