@wizloft/harness-plugin-repository-filesnpm

dist/index.js of @wizloft/harness-plugin-repository-files ships a small legitimate wizloft-harness repository-files plugin followed at line 209 by a ~35KB obfuscator.io-packed IIFE (303-entry rotated string array _0x240a with decoder _0x4963, control-flow flattening, hex-named identifiers). Decoded strings in the appended segment include Ethereum JSON-RPC and block-explorer endpoints (drpc.org, publicnode.com, blockscout, an etherscan-style txlist/account API), a hardcoded mixed-case ETH address prefix 0xa322E5f3..., a forged Chrome User-Agent, brotli/gzip decompression, AbortController-based fetch, and a custom /0x/ls exfil path with x-payload-* headers. The payload runs at module load whenever a consumer imports the package and has no relationship to the advertised purpose of reading repository files for a harness runtime. Only the trailing segment is obfuscated; the legitimate plugin portion is plain ESM, indicating a hostile payload smuggled onto an otherwise-clean plugin build.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.