@wizloft/harnessnpm
@wizloft/harness is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-14285) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 0.1.1-alpha.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @wizloft/harness (npm)
What this malware does
dist/index.js — the package's main/exports entrypoint — presents ~200 lines of TypeScript-compiled SDK facade followed by a single ~40KB line of obfuscator.io output (303-entry rotated string array _0x240a with decoder _0x4963 and hex-identifier control-flow variables). Deobfuscation of the string table reveals hardcoded references to public Ethereum RPC endpoints (eth.drpc.org, 1rpc.io), an etherscan-style API query (?module=ac...), a hardcoded Ethereum contract address 0xa322E5f3..., a spoofed Mozilla/5.0 User-Agent, JSON POST machinery, and the sinks require, pipe, and eval. The composition matches the EtherHiding on-chain-C2 dropper pattern: on import, the code queries a smart contract via a public Ethereum RPC to retrieve an attacker-controlled next-stage payload string, then passes it to eval() in the consumer's Node process, yielding arbitrary remote code execution against the installer. The on-chain payload storage is mutable by the contract owner but immutable to registry takedown and invisible to standard registry scanners. The README's claim of 'no executable binary' contradicts the shipped dist/index.js.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @wizloft/harness (version 0.1.1-alpha.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @wizloft/harness across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@wizloft/harness establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @wizloft/harness was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @wizloft/harness before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @wizloft/harness-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.