@wethenorth12/solana-wallet-adapternpm
@wethenorth12/solana-wallet-adapter is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12101) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 0.18.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @wethenorth12/solana-wallet-adapter (npm)
What this malware does
On require(), index.js JSON-encodes the full process.env plus hostname, username, homedir, platform, cwd, and package metadata, base64-encodes the payload, and sends it as a Telegram Bot API sendMessage GET request to a hardcoded bot token and chat_id (8969499041). A marker file in the OS tmpdir gates the beacon to fire once per host. The package impersonates @solana/wallet-adapter-base: the author field is spoofed as 'anza-xyz', the README advertises a 'drop-in replacement', and the module attempts to require the real @solana/wallet-adapter-base and re-export it so consumers see a working facade while the exfiltration runs silently. Developer and CI environments routinely carry AWS_*, GITHUB_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN, and other credential-shaped variables, so a full env dump to an attacker endpoint is credential theft against the installer.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @wethenorth12/solana-wallet-adapter (version 0.18.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @wethenorth12/solana-wallet-adapter across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@wethenorth12/solana-wallet-adapter is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @wethenorth12/solana-wallet-adapter was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @wethenorth12/solana-wallet-adapter before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @wethenorth12/solana-wallet-adapter-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.