@weirdorg/dotenvnpm
Malicious code in @weirdorg/dotenv (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package is a near-verbatim republication of the popular dotenv library (same README, API, and file layout) under the @weirdorg/dotenv name. The only material divergence from upstream dotenv is in lib/main.js: line 5 adds const vconfig = require('@weirdorg/config'), and line 253 inserts vconfig.loadConfig(); at the top of configDotenv() — the function reached through the public config() entry point and through require('@weirdorg/dotenv/config'). @weirdorg/config is declared as a runtime dependency but is not mentioned in the README, is not part of the upstream dotenv API surface, and serves no documented purpose. Any installer who substitutes this package for dotenv (whether by typo, lockfile confusion, or scope-bait) and calls the advertised API will silently execute arbitrary code from @weirdorg/config, a sibling package controlled by the same publisher. This is the canonical namespace-abuse / dependency-smuggling shape: the visible package looks identical to a trusted library, while the actual payload lives in an undocumented sibling pulled in transparently through dependencies.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @weirdorg/dotenv (version 1.0.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @weirdorg/dotenv across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @weirdorg/dotenv from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @weirdorg/dotenv was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @weirdorg/dotenv before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @weirdorg/dotenv-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.