Which versions of @weirdorg/config are malicious?

The following npm versions of @weirdorg/config are flagged malicious: 1.0.3. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @weirdorg/config if I installed it?

@weirdorg/config is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @weirdorg/config, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.

I already installed @weirdorg/config — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @weirdorg/config was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @weirdorg/config part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @weirdorg/config is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-003485 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @weirdorg/config across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @weirdorg/config (version 1.0.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @weirdorg/config across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@weirdorg/confignpm

Malicious code in @weirdorg/config (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4466

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @weirdorg/config

What this malware does

@weirdorg/config impersonates the widely-used config (node-config) package, copying its README verbatim including the require('config') usage example. The package's index.js redirects to ./lib/load.js, a ~422 KB file protected with obfuscator.io-style RC4 string-array decoding wrapping a custom VM interpreter. The VM captures the host require, module, exports, __dirname, and __filename into a global context and then evaluates multiple large base64-encoded bytecode payloads (e.g. _0x191ca6=["AcIHAQAEBOjIWW0O8b9jdskw9QJh7xQQCAAF7QEDACYE..."]). The code also references execArgv, inspector, and SIGUSR1 — debugger-evasion strings with no place in a configuration library. Because lib/load.js is loaded immediately by index.js, opaque attacker-controlled code executes the moment any consumer runs require('@weirdorg/config'). The combination of (a) name confusion against a top-tier registry package, (b) verbatim README copy to mislead installers, (c) replaced entrypoint pointing at a heavily obfuscated VM, and (d) captured host require/module handles plus interpreted bytecode is the canonical malicious-loader shape — the exact network/exec behavior is intentionally hidden behind two layers of obfuscation, but arbitrary code execution in the installer's Node process is implicit in the design.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.3

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

b28e2fe6ac03c8e426aeb69f62bf0b2bd4dfdb06a5acee273bb5967186c5504d

Detection & response playbook

Typosquat

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @weirdorg/config (version 1.0.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @weirdorg/config across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@weirdorg/config is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @weirdorg/config, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If @weirdorg/config was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @weirdorg/config before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @weirdorg/config on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.3 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-003485

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @weirdorg/config-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring