@webda-infra/searchnpm
Malicious code in @webda-infra/search (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
@webda-infra/[email protected] is a near-empty placeholder (index.js is empty, module.exports = {}) whose package.json declares a single dependency, ltidisafe, resolved via a direct URL to a Google Cloud Storage bucket: https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-2.8.4.tgz. The path segment depenconf, the burner-style version 99.9.1 chosen to outrank any legitimate internal @webda-infra/* package, and the absence of an integrity hash or version pin combine into a dependency-confusion / namespace-squat shape: any npm install that resolves this public package will fetch and install whatever bytes are hosted at that GCS URL, including any preinstall/install/postinstall lifecycle scripts in the resulting tarball. The GCS bucket is unrelated to any verified webda / webda-infra publisher and the URL is mutable — the operator can swap the served bytes at any time. The entire reason to install this package is to pull and execute arbitrary off-registry code on the installer's machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @webda-infra/search (version 99.9.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @webda-infra/search across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @webda-infra/search from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @webda-infra/search was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @webda-infra/search before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @webda-infra/search-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.