@webd-infra/query-designer-domainnpm
Malicious code in @webd-infra/query-designer-domain (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's package.json declares its only dependency ltidisafe as a direct tarball URL: https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-2.8.3.tgz. On npm install, npm fetches this tarball from a Google Cloud Storage bucket (not the npm registry) and runs whatever lifecycle scripts it contains. The bucket owner — not an npm publisher with registry-side accountability — controls exactly which bytes get executed, and the tarball contents at that URL can change at any time. Supporting indicators: the package has empty author and description fields, the version 99.9.1 is the canonical dependency-confusion sentinel used in research/PoC packages, and the bucket path segment is the literal string depenconf. The package itself ships no other runtime code — its sole effect on installers is resolving and executing this off-registry tarball.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @webd-infra/query-designer-domain (version 99.9.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @webd-infra/query-designer-domain across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @webd-infra/query-designer-domain from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @webd-infra/query-designer-domain was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @webd-infra/query-designer-domain before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @webd-infra/query-designer-domain-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.